This paper is devoted to the minimization of the thickness of an elastic structure under competitive loadings. We propose to determine an equilibrium thickness using game theory. We consider two loads exercised separately on two parts of the plate and we aim to optimize both compliances to deal with a multiloading optimization problem. Firstly, we the design variable is taken to be the thickness of the plate. In a second step, we assume that the thickness depends on two independent functions, that we consider as strategies. The multidisciplinary optimization problem is solved as a non-cooperative game and we determine a Nash equilibrium. Finally, some numerical simulations are presented and discuted.
Introduction
Structural optimization has important applications in large fields of applied sciences and engineering, and has taken more attention from many researchers and engineers in the last years. Related computational optimization methods have given received considerable attention in the recent decades. By introducing the techniques of topology optimization to the design of continuum structures [9, 10] , these methods have been applied with success to a variety of types of structural design problems. In general, structural optimization problems are of three classes, including size, shape and topology optimization, for thorough details see for instance ( [3, 6] ). In this work, we consider the optimal design of a plate of variable thickness h. The theme of this work stems from [6] , where the optimal design of the plate is considered. The aim of this paper is to use a game theory approach to determine the optimal thickness of a plate subjected to two loads exercised separately, on two parts of the plate. [11] solved a multidisciplinary optimization problem using a non-cooperative game (Nash Game) where the strategy of the players is naturally defined. In this paper, we firstly consider the state variable to be the plate's thickness. Secondly, we assume that the thickness depends on design strategies of the material s and t. Hence, we obtain a multidisciplinary optimization problem. To determine the optimal thickness as Nash equilibrium, we will use in both cases two criteria j s and j t associated with the two players respectively. We use, in this case, a concurrent optimization realized by an algorithm which solves the Nash game between the two players. The two players act following different objectives; in particular, player 1 has to choose his strategies in order to minimize his function j s , while player 2 has to minimize the function j t . To use this optimization technique, we study different strategies for splitting variables in topology optimization (see section 3).
Setting of the problem
Within the framework of linear elasticity, under the plane strain assumptions, we consider a flat two-dimensional plate section Ω of variable thickness h(x)(see figure 1) .
The boundary of Ω is made of three disjoint parts ∂Ω = Γ D ∪ Γ N ∪ Γ, with Dirichlet boundary conditions on Γ D , and Neumann boundary conditions on Γ N ∪ Γ. The boundary part Γ D is supposed to be fixed , while Γ N is submitted to a g surface load and Γ is free of any load(see figure 2) . 
is the solution of the linear elasticity system
2 is a given surface load, n is the outward normal to the boundary, σ is the associated stress tensor, which is related via Hooke's law to the linearized strain tensor e(u) via σ = 2µhe(u) + λhtr(e(u))I
The linearized strain tensor e(u) is given by
tr denotes the trace of a matrix, and λ, µ are Lame coefficients related to Young's modulus E and to the Poisson ratio ν by:
We aim to optimize the plate by varying its thickness h which is limited by minimal values h min and maximal ones h max , in the admissible set defined by
where, h 0 is an imposed mean thickness h min ≤ h 0 ≤ h max . It is easy to construct a projection operator for each of these constraints taken separately, so the projection operator is:
3 Thickness optimization of an elastic plate
We recall classical results from the literature. Let us consider the compliance minimization problem : min
where
guds, where u solves: (1)
For a given h > 0 there exists a unique solution u of (1) in the space V , where
Theorem 1. The problem (5) admits at least one optimal solution.
Proof. As u is a solution of problem (1), then u is the unique solution of the following minimization problem:
i.e., min
It is then a supremum envelop of continuous affine with respect to the variable h, so it is convex and lower semicontinuous. As a convex function over U h , it is also weak-* lower semicontinuous. Since the set U h is weak-* compact, there exists a minimum of j(h) over h.
We use the Lagrange multiplier method to derive an optimality system of equations from which solutions of the optimization problem (5) may be determined. Let u, v ∈ V , we define the Lagrangian
Setting to zero the first variations with respect to the multiplier v yield the constraints
Setting to zero the first variations with respect to u yield the adjoint equations
By combining the results we get
The topology design of a plate is investigated, a surface load is applied to the plate g = (0, −100). The domain Ω is ]−1, 1[×]0, 1[. The material response is given by equation (2) with a Young's modulus E = 100 and Poisson's ratio ν = 0.3. The upper thickness is h max = 1 and the lower thickness is h min = 0.001.
The procedure described above does not require any great programming efforts in order to solve the compliance topology design problem. In the case of compliance optimization, the state or displacements u is the solution of the linear elasticity equation (1) . We use P 2 × P 2 Lagrange finite elements to We remark that we have obtained a composite structure, i.e. the thickness values vary in the interval [h min , h max ], to find feasible ones we use a penalty technique to force the thickness to take only value 0 or 1. For that, we redo some iterations of minimization using the thickness penalized.
where h opt is the thickness values obtained after convergence and h pen is the thickness value penalized. We present, in figure 4 , the optimal plate obtained by using a penalization technique (15) and SIMP method [3, 6] . Figure 4 present the evolution of the cost function.
The convergence is obtained in less than 40 iterations for computing h opt and from 60th iteration for h pen . The penalization phase took 20 more iterations. The framework described for minimum compliance for a single load case generalizes easily to the situation where design for multiple load conditions is formulated as a minimization of a weighted average of the compliances for each of the load cases as a Nash game.
Split of thickness in concurrent optimization
In the following section, we suppose that the plate is subject to two boundary conditions (multiple loads) figure 5 ). 
Variable thickness
We split the original design variable (thickness h) into two strategies [1, 2] , formally we denote h = (X, Y ) such that X, Y ∈ U h . The split of the variable h is to construct two allocation tables P and Q in {0, 1} n , where P i + Q i = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n is the size of h. Let I 12 = {1, ..., n} be a set of indices of cardinality n, I 1 a subset of I 12 of cardinality n 1 , and I 2 its complement of cardinality n 2 , that is to say I 12 = I 1 ∪ I 2 . Suppose that:
We define in this case the integer allocation table P of size n:
Where "." denote the Hadamard product (i.e. (P.h) i = P i h i , P.h ∈ R n ), and (X, Y ) is defined in equation (16). We consider the functionals j 1 (X, Y ) and j 2 (X, Y ) defined by:
where u 1 is the solution of the problem (P 1 ):
where u 2 is the solution of the problem (P 2 ):
We minimize j 1 and j 2 by acting on U h , until the convergence to a Nash equilibrium h N E . In a competitive game, the two players act following different objectives; in particular, player 1 has to choose his strategies in order to minimize his function j 1 , while player 2 has to minimize the function j 2 . We say that the couple (X , Y ) is a point of Nash equilibrium, if and only if (P )
i.e., when a player cannot improve his criteria over the other, it means that the system reaches a state equilibrium called Nash equilibrium. Solving the Nash equilibrium requires solving the following two problems, namely min
The Nash equilibrium is computed by the following decomposition algorithm. Set n = 0. Starting from an initial design pair
Step 1: Phase 1: solve the problem
Phase 2: solve the problem
Step 2: set h (n+1) = (X (n+1) , Y (n+1) ) until convergence, redo the parallel phases 1 and 2.
The phases 1 and 2 are solved by the finite element method software; FreeFem++. In the case of compliance optimization, the state or displacement u 1 and u 2 are the solution of the linear elasticity problems (P 1 ) and (P 2 ). We use the package of G. Allaire written in Freefem++, for more details see [6] . We propose the Lagrange P 2 × P 2 Finite element method to numerically solve the problem (P 1 ) and (P 2 ), thickness h 1 and h 2 are approximated by means of piecewise-constant interpolation. We will take in this simulation the indices in I 1 that are odd while the indices in I 2 are even. The figure 6 presents the obtained optimal shape by using Nash games between the variables of the odd indices and the ones of the even indices. For the numerical simulation we use the following parameters
The resulting optimal design being composite, it is then "projected" on the set of classical shapes by applying again the previous scheme with the following slight modification: the thickness is updated setting h (n+1) = h pen [3] , where Figure 6 depicts the optimal plate obtained after penalization with Nash equilibrium approach. The Nash overall scheme converged after 3 iterations. We remark that the obtained optimal forme is not quite similar to that obtained by minimizing the function j, hence our splitting is ill-chosen. To avoid using this splitting, we propose to use another technique of thickness splitting. We assume that the thickness depends on two functions s and t. We determine the Nash equilibrium between the two strategies.
Variables strategies of the materials
We are interested in this section in the case where we have two objective functions. We suppose that the plate thickness depends on strategies s(x) and t(x). This problem will be treated as a concurrent optimization problem, by Nash games between two players using two strategies. The first player minimizes his objective function using the first strategy s(x), the second player, using the second one t(x). We shall study the following forms : For example, the choice of 1) is motivated by the requirement that presence of equilibrium material needs the conjunction of presence at optimal material for j 1 and j 2 . A i : event = presence of optimal material for j i ; i = 1, 2 B : event = presence of optimal material at equilibrium. One could interpret 1 − 3 in term of probabilities as :
Of course, as generally both the functions depend on the two domains, the strategies of one player influences the choices of the other one: The two players act simultaneously until an equilibrium is found: in that case, each player has minimized his own function with a common pair of strategies. We introduce the following spaces, of admissible solutions of the strategies s(x) and t(x) respectively:
and
The optimization problem we want to consider are as follows.
where u s is solution of s, t) ) where u t is solution of Theorem 2. There exists a Nash equilibrium (s , t ) ∈ U s × U t solution of the problem (23).
Proof. The sets U s and U t are compact convex for the weak topology L ∞ . The functionals j s and j t are convex and lower semicontinuous for the weak topology L ∞ . In fact, u s is the solution of problem (P s ), so u s is the unique solution of the following minimization problem:
whence,
On the other hand, the function s → Ω (2µh(s, t)|e(v)| 2 +λh(s, t)|divv| 2 )dx is affine with respect to s, accordingly, one concludes that it is weak lower semicontinuous [8] , likewise for j t . Then we have at least the existence of one Nash equilibrium (s , t ) [8] .
For example, a problem considers two objectives to minimize j s (s, t) and j t (s, t) where design variables are s and t. the problem will be solved firstly as a Nash games secondly as a Pareto optimum. In the Nash games, the player 1 will minimize j s with respect to s where the design variable t is fixed by player 2. Player 2 will only optimize t to minimize j t using design variable s fixed by player 1.
Algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium
Set n = 0. Starting from an initial design pair (s (0) , t (0) ).
Phase 1: solve the problem
a. Update the local proportion with a step size ρ (n) s > 0 by
is the Lagrange multiplier for the volume constraint.
b. Penalization
a. Update the local proportion with a step size ρ (n) t > 0 by
n = n + 1. Go to phase 1, until convergence.
The volume constraint Ω h(s, t)dx = h 0 |Ω| is enforced by adjusting the Lagrange multiplier L (n) s and L (n) t by a simple bisection at each iteration.
We set j w = wj s (s, t)
For each w we compute the optima, the set of which forms the Pareto front (at least in the convex case). Our algorithm is an iterative method, structured as follows:
2. Phase 1: solve the problem
a. Update the local proportion with a step size ρ
is the Lagrange multiplier for the volume constraint. optimal strategies s and t obtained with Nash equilibrium in line 2. Figures 9, 12 and 15 presents a comparison between the optimal plate obtained after penalization with each approach (Nash Equilibrium and Pareto optimum) in line 1, and optimal strategies s and t obtained with Nash equilibrium in line 2.
In figure 7 we reproduce the comparison of the Pareto optimum with Nash Equilibrium. We remark that the Nash Equilibrium does not necessarily belong to the set of not-dominated points (Pareto).
Case 1 : h(s,t)=st
Nash Equilibrium Pareto optimum j 1 11.0687 10.80287 j 2 11.0699 10.91279 for Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum (ω = 0.5). In this case, we remark that the obtained optimal shapes by Nash and Pareto are similar. for Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum (ω = 0.5). After penalization, see figure 12 , the shapes associated to strategies s and t are generally symmetric.
Case 3 : h(s,t)=s(1-t)+t(1-s)
Nash Equilibrium Pareto optimum j 1 10.9297 10.7761 j 2 10.9066 10.7758 Table 3 : Objective function values for Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum (ω = 0.5). 
Numerical example : cantilever
Our second example is the well-known cantilever problem which is fixed on the left wall, and supports horizontal and vertical distributed units on the middle of the right wall(see figure 16 ). We begin with single loads, minimal compliance problems, i.e. we minimize the compliance : In what follows, we apply two loads g s and g t and we present results obtained using Nash game and Pareto optimum for different strategies. In this case, our numerical experiments show that the improvement is not sensitive since the optimal shapes are the same than those obtained by Pareto.
Case 1 : h(s,t)=st

Case 2 : h(s,t)=0.5s+0.5t
The result displayed obtained by nash is very similar to the best one in Pareto, and the objective function takes the same value. In this case, the resulting material distribution is not relevant from the mechanical point of view.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented and compared two approaches for solving a structural optimization problem, where we minimize the thickness of a plate subjected to two loads applied separately, on two parts of the plate. The aim of this work has been the study of different strategies for splitting thickness of the plate in multidisciplinary topology optimization. We have splitted the thickness of material to two strategies, and we have computed the Nash equilibrium associated to these strategies, then we have compared this equilibrium with Pareto optimum. In the three cases, we observes that cases 1 and 2 give the real shapes, on the other side the case 3 gives a shape which is different to the initial one. In the three cases, for a specified value of w, we have obtained a Nash equilibrium close to the Pareto optimum for the choice of weights = 0.5.
